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ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS INCORRECTLY STATE THE FACTS 
In the Statement of Facts of Appellees' Brief, plaintiffs state that "the residence 
constructed by the Defendants is not finished with 'a masonry exterior with all brick, or 
brick and stucco, or rock and stucco' as required by Section 3.1(4) of the CC&Rs." See 
Brief of the Appellees (Appellees' Brief) at 5. As set forth in detail below, the evidence 
before the trial court showed that defendants' home was indeed constructed of a masonry 
product composed of materials the same or similar to those that compose traditional 
stucco. Plaintiffs argue that the defendants' home was constructed of a material known 
as Hardi-Plank but fail to mention that Hardi-Plank is indeed a masonry product 
composed of the same material as stucco. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT REGARDING RULE 4-501 DOES NOT 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants failed to raise a disputed issue of material fact in 
the trial court because they did not strictly comply with Utah Rule of Judicial 
Administration 4-501. This Court, following the holding of the Utah Supreme Court, 
however, has interpreted that rule loosely and has held that: 
even where an opposing memorandum [does] not set forth disputed 
facts listed in numbered sentences in a separate section as required 
[by the rule, as long as] the disputed facts [are] clearly provided in 
the body of the memorandum with applicable record references, . . . 
failure to comply with the technical requirements of rule 4-501(2)(B) 
[is] harmless. 
Porter Construction v. Fox Construction, Inc., 2004 UT App 354; 101 P.3d 371 (quoting 
Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, Tf 23 n.4, 89 P.3d 155). 
606 323300vl 
Although defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment ("Opposition Memorandum") does not specifically comply with Rule 4-501, 
such non-compliance is harmless. As set forth fully below, defendants' Opposition 
Memorandum and supporting affidavit properly established disputed issues of material 
fact with respect to ambiguities in the CC&R's. Defendants properly raised and 
preserved disputed issues of material fact regarding the interpretation of the CC&Rs, the 
enforceability of the CC&Rs, waiver or abandonment of the CC&Rs and the entity, if 
any, that existed after expiration of the Architectural Control Committee ("ACC") for 
approval of construction in the subdivision. Because defendants raised several disputed 
material facts in their Opposition Memorandum, as well as in the affidavit supporting the 
Opposition Memorandum, plaintiffs' argument regarding compliance with Rule 4-501 is 
of no moment and the grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs should 
accordingly be reversed. 
III. DEFENDANTS PROPERLY SUBMITTED EVIDENCE REGARDING THE 
HARDI-PLANK MATERIAL AND, ADDITIONAL TIME SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ALLOWED FOR DISCOVERY IN THAT REGARD 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants' assertions regarding the composition of Hardi-
Plank material was not properly supported in the Opposition Memorandum and is 
therefore not properly before this Court. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that defendants' 
assertions regarding the Hardi-Plank material are "not support by an affidavit or any 
discovery material." See Appellees' Brief at 10. 
Plaintiffs' assertion that defendants did not submit affidavits regarding the Hardi-
Plank material is simply incorrect. The Affidavit of Barbara Johnson ("Johnson 
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Affidavit") establishes, based on Ms. Johnson's personal knowledge of the product, that 
the Hardi-Plank material is a masonry product. (R. 130.) This testimony supports 
defendants' argument in the Opposition Memorandum that "Defendants' exterior is 
comprised of brick and a masonry product." (R. 101.) In addition, defendants submitted 
with their Opposition Memorandum pictures and additional information regarding the 
Hardi-Plank.1 (R. 107-119.) 
Plaintiffs did not make any proper foundational or evidentiary objection to the 
Johnson affidavit or materials submitted in support of the Opposition Memorandum and 
have therefore waived any such argument on appeal. See Hobelman Motors v. Allred, 
685 P.2d 544, 546 (Utah 1984) (If party does not move in a timely fashion to object to 
affidavits or strike them, the party waives the right to show that they do not comply with 
Rule 56(e) and the affidavit is deemed admitted.) Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 880 
(Utah 1979) (same). The documents submitted by defendants were not stricken from the 
record and were properly before the trial court and are proper before this Court on appeal. 
Plaintiffs' assertion that defendants' allegations regarding the Hardi-Plank 
material are not supported by "discovery material" only underscores that the trial court 
should have granted defendants' request pursuant to Rule 56(f) for additional time to 
conduct discovery. Defendants could have provided additional information regarding the 
Hardi-Plank material if afforded more time to conduct discovery. The trial court, 
however, improperly denied them such an opportunity by denying their request pursuant 
1
 Plaintiff submitted similar materials regarding Hardi-Plank material in support of their 
Reply Memorandum in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ("Reply 
Memorandum"). (R. 151-52.) 
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to Rule 56(f). Thus, any failure to properly support their assertions regarding the Hardi-
Plank material was due solely to the trial court's refusal to allow defendants additional 
discovery time pursuant to Rule 56(f). 
IV. DEFENDANTS PROPERLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF AMBIGUITY OF 
THE CC&R'S IN THE TRIAL COURT 
While acknowledging that defendants argued the issue of ambiguity in the trial 
court, plaintiffs nonetheless assert that defendants failed to properly raise the issue of 
ambiguity of the CC&Rs in the trial court. See Brief of Appellees at 11. Plaintiffs 
further assert that ambiguity regarding the meaning of the word stucco was not preserved 
below based on the incorrect assertion that defendants' Opposition Memorandum only 
uses the word "ambiguous" once. See Brief of Appellees at 11. 
In order for an issue to be properly preserved for appeal, this Court looks to 
"whether there were disputed issues of material fact or legal argument presented on the 
issue." Holman v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). An issue is properly preserved below where the "argument [is] reasonably 
discernible from the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits. Id. Further, all doubts are 
resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See id. Finally, in determining whether an 
issue was properly raised in the trial court, Utah appellate courts consider whether the 
trial court addressed the argument below. See id. "An argument will be deemed to have 
been raised before the trial court if the trial court had an opportunity to enter findings of 
fact and/or conclusions of law." Id. (citations omitted). 
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Plaintiffs' statement of fact in paragraph 8 of their Motion for Summary Judgment 
cites the CC&Rs and states that: 
Because more than five years have passed since the date of the 
CC&R's, the responsibilities of the Architectural Control Committee 
have now reverted to the owners of the 26 lots in Phase 2 of the 
South Jordan Estates. (R. 41.) 
In their Opposition Memorandum, defendants dispute plaintiffs5 interpretation of 
the CC&Rs and argue that plaintiffs "are attempting to enforce certain language in an 
ambiguous document that expired according to its terms, are ambiguous on their face at 
best and would be impossible to comply in any event." (R. 97) (emphasis added). 
A. Defendants Raised and Established an Ambiguity With Respect to the 
Termination of the Architectural Control Committee, its Successor, if 
Any, and the Procedure for Submission and Approval of Construction 
Plans, 
Defendants argued in the trial court that the CC&Rs are ambiguous "because the 
homeowners never attempted to establish an architectural control committee with legally 
cognizable authority to enforce the guidelines." (R. 100.) Plaintiffs'assertions regarding 
the CC&Rs are specifically disputed by defendants in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the 
Opposition Memorandum where defendants demonstrate that the CC&Rs are ambiguous 
regarding the procedure for submission and approval of construction plans after 
termination of the ACC: 
Plaintiffs interpret the document incorrectly and presume that some 
successor architectural control committee started to function after 
the five year period. There was no architectural control committee 
extant and there was no mechanism to submit any plan save the City 
of South Jordan. Consequently, the City of South Jordan became the 
arbiter of the DCC&R's (if they still have viability) because the 
homeowners never incorporated the architectural control committee 
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as a functioning unit of a legally cognizable association or other 
legal entity. (R. 98.) 
Simply put, there was no entity or person to submit the plan for 
approval even assuming that the restrictions were somehow in effect 
because of the five year automatic limit on the restriction. There 
was no covenant, condition or restriction that could revert back to 
the homeowners without some association to accept the reverter. 
Moreover, the DCC&R's is not a self-authenticating document and 
defendants move to strike the exhibit for lack of foundation. (R. 99.), 
The Johnson Affidavit also supports defendants' argument regarding ambiguity in 
the CC&Rs as follows: 
9. I called South Jordan and explained what I had been told and to 
find out if I needed to remove the exterior, which had just been 
previously approved. They assured me theife was no problem as 
Hardi-Plank is a masonry exterior and thus met the requirements 
for this area of South Jordan. (R. 130.) 
Defendants' argument in the Opposition Memorandum and factual assertions in 
the Johnson Affidavit show that the CC&Rs are ambiguous with respect to whether an 
entity existed after termination of the ACC for approval of construction plans, what 
individuals made up the entity if it existed whether the entity was comprised of every 
owner in the subdivision or some smaller sub-group and what was the procedure for 
submitting and obtaining approval for construction plans. Despite the fact that 
defendants' Opposition Memorandum does not use the word "ambiguous" any certain 
number of times is not dispositive of whether the issue was properly preserved for appeal. 
Defendants raised and argued the issue of ambiguity before the trial court.2 Plaintiffs' 
The issue of ambiguity in the CC&Rs regarding the termination of the ACC and the 
procedure for approval of construction plans after its termination is further addressed 
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argument that defendants failed to preserve that issue for appeal is without support and 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed. 
B. Defendants Properly Demonstrated that the Definition of the Word 
"Stucco" is Ambiguous, 
Plaintiffs further argue that ambiguity of the word stucco was not raised in the trial 
court. Again, the record does not support plaintiffs' argument. In their Opposition 
Memorandum, defendants argue that the: 
guidelines say the exterior must be masonry with all brick or brick 
and stucco and rock and stucco. The obvious intent was to avoid 
aluminum or vinyl siding. [Defendants'] exterior fa9ade is made of 
brick and a masonry product called "Hardiplank." Hardiplank is a 
new masonry material that is made of fiber-cement. Its basic 
composition is cement, ground sand, cellulosq fiber and select 
additives. Hardiplank has a cedarmill or rough sawn finish, factory 
rimed, resistant to rot and mildew and is a superior product to certain 
stucco applications which are notorious for rot, mildew and termite 
infestation. (R. 101.) 
The Johnson Affidavit further states that Hardi-Plank is a masonry product. (R. 
130.) The composition of the material used on defendants' home and whether it complies 
with the CC&Rs was clearly raised by defendants in the trial court. Plaintiffs' argument 
that the issue of the definition of the word "stucco" was not preserved below should be 
rejected by this Court. 
Finally, the trial court specifically acknowledged defendants' argument regarding 
ambiguity and made explicit findings in that regard. The trial court stated in its ruling: 
The Court categorically rejects Defendants' claims that the CC&R 
provision dealing with home exteriors is ambiguous. It is difficult to 
below in response to plaintiffs' additional argument that defendants failed to preserve this 
issue in the trial court. 
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fathom more clear and unambiguous language than that which states 
the exterior finish of homes in the subdivision must be all brick, 
brick and stucco or rock and stucco. (R. 165.) 
Defendants specifically and properly raised the issue of ambiguity of the type of 
material permitted under the CC&Rs. The trial court considered the issue and 
specifically addressed it in its findings and ruling. Plaintiffs' argument that issue was not 
properly preserved on appeal is without merit and the trial court's ruling should be 
reversed. 
Plaintiffs assert that in order to show ambiguity in the CC&R's regarding the 
meaning of the term stucco, defendants must submit two or more reasonable 
interpretations of the word. See Brief of Appellees at 12. This is an overstatement of the 
requirements of the law. In order to show ambiguity, a word must be "susceptible to two 
or more reasonable meaninRS." View Condo. Owners Ass 'n v. MSICO, L.L.C., 2004 UT 
App. 104, f 19, 90 P.3d 1042 (emphasis added). In any event, defendants did indeed 
submit two reasonable interpretations of the word. 
In this case, defendants argue that the meaning of the word stucco is ambiguous 
because the CC&Rs do not specifically set forth what type of materials would fall within 
the definition of that word. Put another way, defendants argue that the word stucco may 
include materials traditionally considered stucco, as the trial court apparently defined the 
word, or that the word stucco may include materials composed of the same materials as 
traditional stucco, but perhaps with a different appearance than traditional stucco. In any 
event, defendants properly demonstrated that the word stucco is susceptible to two 
different reasonable interpretations and is therefore ambiguous. 
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Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that defendants have not offered a reasonable and plain 
and ordinary definition of the word stucco that would include the Hardiplank material. 
See Brief of Appellees at 13. Defendants' definition of the word stucco comes directly 
from Webster's Collegiate Dictionary and would include materials such as Hardiplank 
that are made of made of masonry compounds such as cement and sand. See Appellants 
Brief at 15. Utah courts routinely look to the dictionary definition of a word to determine 
its plain and ordinary meaning. See Salem City v. Farnsworth, 753 P.2d 514, 516 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) (looking to Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary for the plain meaning of 
the word "occupy"); Dawson v. Dawson, 841 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (using 
American Heritage Dictionary definition of the word "vacant"); O'Keefe v. Utah State 
Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 1998) (defining the word "overtime" pursuant 
to the definition in Webster's Third New International Dictionary). Plaintiffs' assertion 
that defendants have failed to offer a plain and reasonable definition of the word "stucco" 
that would include Hardi-Plank is without merit. Because the definition of the word 
stucco could be interpreted to include the Hardi-plank material, the word, as it is used in 
the CC&Rs, is ambiguous and questions of fact remain regarding its meaning. The trial 
court's grant of summary judgment is accordingly improper and should be reversed. 
C, Ambiguity in the CC&Rs is a Question of Fact. 
Plaintiffs assert that the initial determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is 
a question of law. See Brief of Appellees at 13. That rule, however, applies only if the 
terms of the contract are unambiguous, i.e., not capable of more than one reasonable 
meaning. See Enerco, Inc. v. SOS Staffing Servs., 2002 UT 78, U 10 (Utah 2002). As set 
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forth in Appellants' Brief and the arguments set forth above, the meaning of the word 
stucco in the CC&Rs is susceptible to at least two different meanings and is therefore 
ambiguous. In addition, the terms of the CC&Rs regarding the ACQ its termination and 
the procedure for review and approval of construction plans after the termination of the 
ACC may be interpreted in numerous ways. The CC&Rs are ambiguous on their face 
and questions of fact remain as to the meaning of the tenns in the CC&Rs and the parties' 
intentions regarding those terms. It was therefore improper for the trial court to 
determine otherwise on summary judgment. Plaintiffs' argument that the determination 
of ambiguity in a contract is a question of law is inapplicable to this case and the trial 
court's ruling should accordingly be reversed and remanded for findings regarding the 
meaning of the ambiguities in the CC&Rs. 
D. Defendants Properly Preserved the Issue of Approval Under the 
CC&Rs and Demonstrated Ambiguity in that Regard. 
Plaintiffs summarily conclude that defendants failed to preserve the issue of how 
an owner in the subdivision would submit and obtain approval after termination of the 
ACC. The record demonstrates otherwise. Paragraph 3 of defendants' Opposition 
Memorandum asserts that upon termination of the ACC, no person or entity existed to 
whom plans for construction could be submitted. (R. 98.) Defendants argued the 
following to show ambiguity in the CC&Rs: 
THE JOHNSONS DID NOT SUBMIT THE PLANS TO THE ARCHITECTURAL 
COMMITTEE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SUCH LEGALLY COGNIZABLE 
COMMITTEE CREATED TO SUBMIT THE PLANS FOR APPROVAL 
Defendants asserted that the [CC&Rs] and the guideline expired by 
their own terms. . . . It is presumed that any reversion of the 
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guidelines after the expiration of their own terms would revert to 
some entity created by the homeowners assuming that the [CC&Rs] 
allow a mechanism for such reverter clause. There is in fact none. 
The [CC&Rs] were created for the benefit of the developer. Once 
the developer had completed the development, it was at least 
required of the homeowners to create some type of homeowners 
association to establish an architectural committee to have the 
reversion effective. 
Defendants' argument in the trial court regarding approval under the CC&Rs was 
clearly discernible and the trial court specifically addressed the issue in its ruling stating 
that: 
Essentially, the ACC became a "committee of the whole" of the Lot 
Owners." . . . The subdivision at issue is only comprised of 26 lots. 
Therefore, a committee of the whole could have been organized for 
purpose[s] of this review issue . . . ." (R. 164()( 
Because defendants properly raised the issue of ambiguity regarding submission 
and approval of construction plans under the CC&Rs after termination of the ACC, and 
the trial court entered specific findings in that regard, plaintiffs' argument that the issue 
was not properly preserved below must be rejected. 
Plaintiffs further argue that the CC&Rs do not contain ambiguity regarding 
obtaining approval for construction in the subdivision and state that "the CC&Rs are 
clear about the procedure for obtaining approvals from the Committee or from the Lot 
Owners to whom the Committee's responsibilities revert after five years. See Brief of the 
Appellees at 14. 
In Leaver v. Grose, 563 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court addressed 
the question of ambiguity in restrictive covenants. Id. at 774. The restrictive covenants 
in that case provided that the covenants would be enforced during the initial twenty-five 
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(25) year period, but the CC&Rs did not contain a provision governing enforcement of 
the CC&Rs during the period thereafter. See id. 
The CC&Rs in Leaver were "simply silent on the subject" of enforcement after the 
initial period. See id. "Consequently, a question of fact arises as to the intention of the 
parties, i.e., did the framers of the covenants actually intend to provide for prosecution of 
violations after the expiration of the twenty-five (25) years and merely left out" clarifying 
language regarding later enforcement or did they intend that no enforcement would occur 
after the initial period? Id. Based on the ambiguities in the CC&Rs in Leaver and the 
related questions of fact, the court held that the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment where an ambiguity existed regarding the "intention of the parties . . . which 
required the taking of evidence." Id. 
In this case, like Leaver, the CC&Rs, despite being clear regarding submission and 
approval of plans to the ACC, are unclear and ambiguous as to the requirements, 
guidelines and/or procedures governing the process after termination of the ACC. For 
example, the CC&Rs fail to address the following questions: (1) Were defendants 
required to submit a separate set of plans to each and every of the twenty-six 
homeowners in the subdivision (despite the obvious high cost of such a requirement)? (2) 
Was written approval or denial required from every homeowner within thirty days 
(despite the unlikliness that such unanimity could be obtained)? (3) What were 
defendants5 options if they did not receive written approval or rejection from every owner 
within thirty days? (4) Were defendants required to submit a set of plans to a smaller 
sub-group of homeowners? (5) Which owners, if any, comprised the group to whom 
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plans should be submitted and approved? (6) What procedures, if any, could defendants 
use to appeal a denial of their construction plans? and (7) Could defendants properly 
obtain approval from the city in the absence of the existence of any entity after 
termination of the ACC? These are just a few of the questions that the CC&Rs fail to 
address. Even the trial court acknowledges the ambiguity in its ruling by stating, without 
citation to any such requirement in the CC&Rs, that it was defendants' obligation to try 
to "engage in a dialogue with their neighbors around resolution of the issues" and that 
"there appears to be some discretion granted to the ACC (or its successor, the committee 
of the whole of Lot Owners) to grant specific approval for other materials if a proper and 
timely request is made." (R. 165) (emphasis added). The fact that the trial court is 
guessing as to the procedure and placing obligations on defendants that do not exist in the 
CC&R's demonstrates the ambiguity with respect to the approval procedure. The trial 
court's ruling should accordingly be reversed and remanded for findings regarding the 
ambiguities in the CC&Rs. 
E. The Trial Court Erred in Ruling as a Matter of Law that the CC&Rs 
Were Not Abandoned, 
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court properly ruled that the CC&Rs have not been 
abandoned. There was simply not enough evidence presented for the trial court to make 
such a determination. Defendants were prevented, as a result of plaintiffs' failure to 
comply with Rule 26(f) and the trial court's denial of its request under Rule 56(f), which 
are discussed more fully below, from conducting any discovery that would have allowed 
them to demonstrate non-compliance with the covenants constituting abandonment. 
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Defendants submitted in the Johnson Affidavit information regarding violations of the 
CC&Rs by other owners that were readily apparent. However, detailed information 
regarding the construction of other homes in the subdivision, the materials used for such 
construction, the approval process, if any utilized by other owners for construction of 
their homes and the specific number of violations could not be ascertained by defendants 
without discovery on these issues. 
In the trial court's Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Denying Defendants' Rule 56(f) motion, the trial court acknowledged that it 
did not have sufficient information to rule on the issue of waiver or abandonment of the 
CC&Rs. With respect to defendants' allegations of other violation of the CC&Rs in the 
subdivision and failure to obtain review and approval for construction, the trial court 
stated: 
The Court notes that some of these allegations in the affidavit do not 
appear to be statements made of personal knowledge, and therefore 
would be inadmissible and insufficient to create a material issue of 
fact in dispute for purpose of resisting the summary judgment 
motion. (R. 166 n.2) 
Rather than allowing defendants additional time to conduct discovery on the issue 
of waiver and abandonment of the CC&Rs, and obtain admissible evidence in that regard, 
the trial court simply granted summary judgment without sufficient evidence before it on 
that issue. The trial court's determination as a matter of law that the CC&Rs were not 
abandoned, without sufficient evidence supporting such a finding, was error and should 
accordingly be reversed. 
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V. DEFENDANTS PROPERLY PRESERVED THEIR ARGUMENT 
REGARDING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants failed to preserve the issue of injunctive relief in 
the trial court because the words "injunctive" or "balancing" were not used in defendants' 
Opposition Memorandum. Whether an issue is preserved for appeal does not, however, 
depend on the use of any specific words in the trial court. Rather, the inquiry is whether 
the argument was reasonably discernible from a party's pleadings and whether the trial 
court addressed the issue. See Holman v. Callister, Duncan & Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895, 
898 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In their Opposition Memorandum, defendants argue, with support from the 
Affidavit of Ms. Johnson, that the Hardiplank material is necessary due to Ms. Johnson's 
asthma and allergies. Removal of the material and replacement with traditional stucco 
which is more susceptible to allergens such as mold and mildew would pose a substantial 
hardship for Ms. Johnson and her health problems. Further, defendants argue that the 
Hardi-plank material is more expensive than traditional stucco. Thus, it can be inferred 
that removal and replacement of the entire exterior of defendants' home would clearly 
work a financial and health hardship on them. Finally, defendants argue that the CC&Rs 
should not be enforced. The CC&Rs contain the provision allowing for injunctive relief. 
Thus, although defendants did not use any specific terminology regarding injunctive 
relief, the argument was implicit in their Opposition Memorandum and should be 
considered by this Court on appeal. 
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A, The Balance of Hardships Weighs in Favor of Defendants and a 
Question of Fact Exists in that Regard, 
Plaintiffs argue that a balancing of injuries does not weigh in favor of defendants. 
Plaintiffs' argument in this regard demonstrates the existence of disputed facts regarding 
the relative harm to the parties. For instance, plaintiffs speculate that "it is certainly 
unlikely that the replacement of the siding would be more burdensome than 'removal of 
river moorage or the disassembly of a building encroachment.5" Appellees' Brief at 19-
20. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that they would face substantial expense in 
replacing the Hardiplank material. In any event, an issue of fact exists regarding the cost 
of compliance with the injunction and relative harms related thereto. Summary judgment 
was therefore inappropriate in this instance and should be reversed. 
Plaintiffs further argue that defendants' alleged violation of the CC&Rs was 
willful. See Brief of the Appellees at 20. Defendants dispute that argument with 
evidence that any violation was not willful due to defendants' initial belief that no 
CC&Rs existed and due to the city's assurance that the Hardi-Plank material was 
permitted. Again, an issue of fact exists as to the willfulness of any violation of the 
CC&Rs. 
Finally, plaintiffs argue that defendants presented no evidence that they could be 
adequately compensated by damages. See Brief of the Appellees at 20. It is not, 
however, incumbent on defendants to prove plaintiffs' damages. Rather, in seeking 
injunctive relief, plaintiffs must demonstrate that injunctive relief is proper because they 
cannot be adequately compensated by damages. Plaintiffs, however, submitted no 
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evidence regarding damages or any evidence that they could not be adequately 
compensated by monetary damages or some other relief. Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 
105, f 25 (Utah 2001) (injunctive relief improper if party can be adequately compensated 
by damages). The trial court did not balance the relative hardships in granting injunctive 
relief and did not acknowledge the issues of fact in that regard. In addition, plaintiffs 
failed to demonstrate the propriety of injunctive relief. The trial court therefore 
improperly granted the motion for summary judgment and the trial court's ruling should 
accordingly be reversed and remanded. 
VL THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS9 REQUEST 
UNDER RULE 56(F) 
Plaintiffs argue, without citation to any supporting authority, that the trial court 
properly denied defendants' request under Rule 56(f) because this action is not subject to 
Rule 26 and defendants therefore could have conducted discovery at any time. Plaintiffs5 
argument stretches beyond credibility the plain meaning of the rule. Rule 26 does not, as 
plaintiffs argue, state that any action for injunctive relief under a contract with an 
unspecified claim for attorneys' fees is exempt from the requirements of the Rule. 
Rather, the rule states that an action under a contract in which "the amount demanded in 
the pleadings is $20,000 or less" is exempt from Rule 26(f). 
The Complaint in this action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and seeks 
attorneys' fees in an unspecified amount. (R. 1-8.) The Complaint does not demand any 
damages under $20,000 as required in order to be exempt from Rule 26(f). This action is 
therefore subject to the requirements of Rule 26(f). Plaintiffs, however, failed to fulfill 
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their obligations under Rule 26 to initiate an attorneys' planning meeting and submit a 
scheduling order to the court regarding discovery. Defendants were therefore deprived of 
any opportunity to conduct discovery before the ruling on the motion for summary 
judgment. The trial court accordingly erred in denying defendants' request under Rule 
56(f) and the ruling should accordingly be reversed. 
Plaintiffs argue that defendants were not timely in their Rule 56(f) request because 
they failed to take steps to commence discovery. As stated above, Rule 26(f) applies in 
this instance and defendants were prohibited from conducting any discovery until 
plaintiffs initiated an attorney planning meeting and submitted a discovery schedule to 
the court. Plaintiffs cannot argue that defendants were not timely in seeking discovery 
when it was plaintiffs own delay and failure to comply with Rule 26(f) that prevented 
defendants from conducting necessary discovery. Plaintiffs' argument that defendants' 
Rule 56(f) request was dilatory should be rejected by this Court and the denial of the 
request under Rule 56(f) should be reversed. 
Plaintiffs further argue that defendants failed to identify information in the 
exclusive knowledge and control of plaintiffs. Defendants did, however, identify four 
areas in which additional discovery was needed, including the validity of the CC&Rs, 
abandonment of the CC&Rs, impossibility of performance and the issue of estoppel. 
Each of these areas include information that was either in the possession and control of 
plaintiffs or that could not have been obtained without additional discovery. Contrary to 
plaintiffs' assertions, simply walking around the neighborhood and taking pictures, 
especially where most neighbors in the subdivision were hostile to defendants as a result 
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of this lawsuit, would not have provided defendants with necessary information regarding 
the above-listed areas. For example, additional discovery was needed to determine the 
type of materials used for other homes in the subdivision, compliance by other residents 
with the CC&Rs, whether any other construction in the subdivision had been submitted 
for approval by the ACC or some successor entity and the procedure used for submitting 
and obtaining such approval. All such information could have been obtained only 
through formal discovery. The trial court accordingly erred in failing to grant 
defendants' request pursuant to Rule 56(f) and it should be reversed and remanded. 
Further, defendants' estoppel claim required proof of the following highly fact 
intensive elements: "(1) a n admission, statement or act inconsistent with the claim 
afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement 
or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or act." Department of Human Servs. 
ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl, 896 
P.2d 644, 648 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Defendants submitted evidence to the trial court 
that several owners in the Subdivision stated that no restrictive covenants existed. 
Additional discovery, however, was needed in order for defendants to prove an estoppel 
claim. Because the trial court improperly denied defendants' request for additional 
discovery regarding the fact-intensive estoppel claim, the ruling should accordingly be 
reversed. 
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VII. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS9 
FEES 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees either in the trial court or 
on appeal. For the reasons set forth above, the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiffs and this case should be remanded for further proceedings. 
Because the prevailing party in this action cannot be determined without a trial on the 
merits, an award of attorneys' fees at this juncture is inappropriate and plaintiffs' request 
for fees should accordingly be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants properly raised and preserved several issues of fact in the trial court. 
Those issues include ambiguity in the CC&Rs regarding termination of the ACC, the 
successor entity, if any, to the ACC, the process for submission and approval of plans for 
construction in the subdivision, waiver or abandonment of the CC&Rs and estoppel. 
Because disputed material facts exist with respect to each of these issues, summary 
judgment was improper and the trial court's ruling should be reversed. In addition, the 
trial court's denial of defendants' request under Rule 56(f) was also improper because 
defendants were denied any opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the issues raised 
by plaintiffs in their Motion for Summary Judgment. The denial of defendants' request 
under rule 56(f) should also be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
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